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Abstract
The game of Prisoner Dilemma is analyzed to study the role of mea-
surement basis in quantum games. Four different types of payoffs for
quantum games are identified on the basis of different combinations of
initial state and measurement basis. A relation among these different
payoffs is established.
1 Introduction
Game theory deals with a situation in which two or more parties compete to
maximize their respective payoffs by playing suitable strategies according to the
known payoff matrix. Extension of game theory to quantum domain with quan-
tization of the strategy space has shown clear advantage over classical strategies
[1, 2, 3, 5]. A detailed description on classical and quantum game theory can
be found in [6, 7]
In quantum version of the game arbiter prepares an initial quantum state
and passes it on to the players (generally referred as Alice and Bob). After
applying their local operators (or strategies) the players return the state to
arbiter who then announces the payoffs by performing a measurement with the
application of suitable payoff operators depending on the payoff matrix of the
game. The role of the initial quantum state remained an interesting issue in
quantum games [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, the importance of the payoff operators
used by arbiter to perform measurement to determine the payoffs of the players
remained unnoticed. In our earlier paper [8] we have pointed out the importance
of measurement basis in quantum games. It was shown that if the arbiter is
allowed to perform the measurement in the entangled basis interesting situations
could arise which were not possible in the frame work of Eisert et. al. [2] and
Marinatto et. al. [3] schemes. In this paper we further extend our earlier
work to investigate the role of measurement basis in quantum games by taking
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Prisoner Dilemma as an example. In this scenario quantum payoffs are divided
into four different categories on the basis of initial state and measurement basis.
These different situations arise due the possibility of having product or entangled
initial state and then applying product or entangled basis for the measurement
[9, 10]. In the context of our generalized framework for quantum games, the
four different types of payoffs are
(i) $PP is the payoff when the initial quantum state is of the product form
and product basis are used for measurement to determine the payoff.
(ii) $PE is the payoff when the initial quantum state is of the product form
and entangled basis are used for measurement to determine the payoff.
(iii) $EP is the payoff when the initial quantum state is entangled and prod-
uct basis are used for measurement to determine the payoff.
(iv) $EE is the payoff when the initial quantum state is entangled and en-
tangled basis are used for measurement to determine the payoff.
Our results show that these payoffs obey a relation, $PP < $PE = $EP <
$EE at the Nash Equilibrium (NE). This is also interesting to note that the role
of entangled and /or product input and entangled and/or product measurement
in this relation is very similar to its role in the existing relation for the classical
capacities of the quantum channels. It is shown in the Ref. [11] that for a
quantum channel the capability to transmit maximum classical information,
called the classical channel capacity C of a quantum channel, a relation of the
form CPP < CPE = CEP < CEE holds. In this paper we have not tried to
investigate the possible relationship between channel capacity and payoff’s.
2 Prisoner Dilemma
In the game of Prisoner Dilemma two prisoners are being interrogated in sep-
arate cells for a crime they have committed together. The two possible moves
for these prisoners are to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). They are not allowed
to communicate but have access to the following payoff matrix:
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D[
(3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)
]
, (1)
It can be seen from the Eq. (1) that D is the dominant strategy for the
two players. Therefore, rational reasoning forces each player to play D causing
(D,D) as the Nash equilibrium of the game with payoffs (1,1), i.e., 1 for both.
The players could have got higher payoffs had both of them decided to play C
instead of D. This is the dilemma in this game [12]. Eisert et. al [2] analyzed
this game in quantum domain and showed that there exist a suitable quantum
strategy for which the dilemma is resolved. They also pointed out a quantum
strategy which always wins over all classical strategies.
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In our generalized version of quantum games the arbiter prepares the initial
state of the form
|ψin〉 = cos
γ
2
|CC〉 + i sin
γ
2
|DD〉 . (2)
Here |C〉 and |D〉, represent vectors in the strategy space corresponding to
Cooperate and Defect, respectively with γ ∈ [0, pi] . The strategy of each of the
players can be represented by the unitary operator Ui of the form
Ui = cos
θi
2
Ri + sin
θi
2
Pi, (3)
where i = 1 or 2 and Ri, Pi are the unitary operators defined as:
Ri |C〉 = e
iφ
i |C〉 , Ri |D〉 = e
−iφ
i |D〉 ,
Pi |C〉 = − |D〉 , Pi |D〉 = |C〉 . (4)
Here we restrict our treatment to two parameter set of strategies (θi, φi) for
mathematical simplicity in accordance with the Ref. [2]. After the application
of the strategies, the initial state given by the eq. (2) transforms to
∣∣ψf〉 = (U1 ⊗ U2) |ψin〉 . (5)
and using Eqs. (4) and (5) the above expression becomes
∣∣ψf〉 = cos (γ/2)
[
cos (θ1/2) cos (θ2/2) e
i(φ
1
+φ
2
) |CC〉 − cos (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) e
iφ
1 |CD〉
− cos (θ2/2) sin (θ1/2) e
iφ
2 |DC〉+ sin (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) |DD〉
]
+ i sin (γ/2)
[
cos (θ1/2) cos (θ2/2) e
−i(φ
1
+φ
2
) |DD〉+ cos (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) e
−iφ
1 |DC〉
+ cos (θ2/2) sin (θ1/2) e
−iφ
2 |CD〉+ sin (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) |CC〉
]
. (6)
The operators used by the arbiter to determine the payoff for Alice and Bob are
PA = 3PCC + PDD + 5PDC
PB = 3PCC + PDD + 5PCD (7)
where
PCC = |ψCC〉 〈ψCC | , |ψCC〉 = cos (δ/2) |CC〉+ i sin (δ/2) |DD〉 , (8a)
PDD = |ψDD〉 〈ψDD| , |ψDD〉 = cos (δ/2) |DD〉+ i sin (δ/2) |CC〉 , (8b)
PDC = |ψDC〉 〈ψDC | , |ψDC〉 = cos (δ/2) |DC〉 − i sin (δ/2) |CD〉 , (8c)
PCD = |ψCD〉 〈ψCD| , |ψCD〉 = cos (δ/2) |CD〉 − i sin (δ/2) |DC〉 , (8d)
with δ ∈ [0, pi]. Above payoff operators reduce to that of Eisert’s scheme for δ
equal to γ, which represents the entanglement of the initial state [2]. And for
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δ = 0 above operators transform into that of Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [3].
In our generalized quantization scheme, payoffs for the players are calculated as
$A(θ1, φ1, θ2, φ2) = Tr(PAρf ),
$B(θ1, φ1, θ2, φ2) = Tr(PBρf ), (9)
where ρf =
∣∣ψf〉 〈ψf ∣∣ is the density matrix for the quantum state given by
(6) and Tr represents the trace of a matrix. Using Eqs. (6), (8), and (9), we get
the following payoffs
$A
(
θi, φj
)
= sin2 (θ1/2) sin
2 (θ2/2)
[
cos2
(
γ + δ
2
)
+ 3 sin2
(
γ − δ
2
)]
+cos2 (θ1/2) cos
2 (θ2/2) [2 + cos γ cos δ + 2 cos (2δ (φ1 + φ2)) sin γ sin δ]
− sin θ1 sin θ2 sin (φ1 + φ2) [sin γ − sin δ] +
5
4
[1− cos θ1 cos θ2]
+
5
4
(cos θ2 − cos θ1) [cos γ cos δ + cos (2φ1) sin γ sin δ] . (10)
The payoff of player B can be found by interchanging θ1 ←→ θ2 and φ1 ←→
φ2 in the Eq. (10). There can be four types of payoffs for each player for
different combinations of δ and γ. In the following $PP (θ1, θ2) means payoffs
of the players when the initial state of the game is product state and payoff
operator used by arbiter for measurement is also in the product form (γ =
0, δ = 0) and $EP (θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2) means the payoffs for entangled input state
when the payoff operator used for measurement is in the product form, i.e.,
(γ 6= 0, δ = 0). Similarly $PE (θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2) and $EE (θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2) can also be
interpreted. Therefore, for different values of δ and γ the following four cases
can be identified:
Case (a) When δ = γ = 0, the Eq.(10), becomes
$APP (θ1, θ2) = 3 cos
2 (θ1/2) cos
2 (θ2/2)+sin
2 (θ1/2) sin
2 (θ2/2)+5 sin
2 (θ1/2) cos
2 (θ2/2)
(11a)
This situation corresponds to the classical game where each player play, C, with
probability cos2 (θi/2) with i = 1, 2 [13]. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to
θ1 = θ2 = pi, i.e., (D,D) with payoffs for both the players as
$APP (θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = $
B
PP (θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = 1. (12)
Case (b) When γ = 0, δ 6= 0, in the Eq. (10), then the game has two Nash
equilibria one at θ1 = θ2 = 0 when sin
2 (δ/2) ≥ 23 and the other at θ1 = θ2 = pi
when sin2 (δ/2) ≤ 13 . The corresponding payoffs for these Nash equilibria are
$APE(θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0) = $
B
PE(θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0) = 3− 2 sin
2 (δ/2) ,
$APE(θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = $
B
PE(θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = 1 + 2 sin
2 (δ/2) . (13)
Here in this case at NE the payoffs are independent of φ1, φ2. It is clear that
the above payoffs for all the allowed values of δ remain less than 3, which is the
optimal payoff for the two players if they cooperate.
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Case (c) For γ 6= 0, and δ = 0, the Eqs. (10) again gives two Nash equilibria
one at θ1 = θ2 = 0 when sin
2 (γ/2) ≥ 23 and the other at θ1 = θ2 = pi when
sin2 (γ/2) ≤ 13 . The corresponding payoffs are
$AEP (θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0) = $
B
EP (θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0) = 3− 2 sin
2 (γ/2) ,
$AEP (θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = $
B
EP (θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi) = 1 + 2 sin
2 (γ/2) . (14)
It can be seen that the payoffs at both Nash equilibrium for allowed values of
sin2 γ2 remain less than 3. From the Eqs. (13) and (14), it is also clear that
$AEP (0, 0) = $
A
PE(pi, pi) only for δ = γ.
Case (d) When γ = δ = pi/2, Eqs. (10) becomes
$AEE (θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2) = 3 [cos (θ1/2) cos (θ2/2) cos (φ1 + φ2)]
2
+ [sin (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) + cos (θ1/2) cos (θ2/2) sin (φ1 + φ2)]
2
+ 5
[
sin (θ1/2) cos
θ2
2
cosφ2 − cos (θ1/2) sin (θ2/2) sinφ1
]2
(15a)
This payoff is same as found by Eisert et. al. [2] and θ1 = θ2 = 0, φ1 = φ2 =
pi
2
is the Nash equilibrium [2] of the game that gives the payoffs for both players
as
$AEE(0, 0,
pi
2
,
pi
2
) = $BEE(0, 0,
pi
2
,
pi
2
) = 3 (16)
Comparing eqs. (12,13,14,16), it is evident that
$lEE(0, 0,
pi
2
,
pi
2
) >
(
$lPE(θ1 = k, θ2 = k), $
l
EP (θ1 = k, θ2 = k)
)
> $lPP (θ1 = pi, θ2 = pi)
(17)
and
$lPE(θ1 = k, θ2 = k) = $
l
EP (θ1 = k, θ2 = k) for γ = δ (18)
with k = 0, pi and l = A,B. This expression shows the crucial role of entan-
glement in quantum games. The combination of initial entangled state with
entangled payoff operators gives higher payoffs as copmared to all other combi-
nations of γ and δ.
3 Conclusion
In quantum games the arbiter (the referee) prepares an initial quantum state
and passes it on to the players (Alice and Bob). After applying their local
operators (their strategies) the players return their state to the arbiter. The
arbiter then performs a measurement on the final state by applying the payoff
operators to determine the payoffs of the player on the basis of payoff matrix
of the game. In our earlier paper [8], we pointed out the importance of mea-
surement in the quantum games. Here we extended our earlier work, by taking
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Prisoner Dilemma game as an example and showed that depending on the ini-
tial states and type of measurement (product or entangled), quantum payoffs
in games can be categories in to four different types. These four categories are
$PP , $PE , $EP , $EE where P, and E are abbreviations for the product and en-
tanglement at input and output. It is shown that there exists a relation of the
form $PP < $PE = $EP < $EE among different payoffs at the NE.
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